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TRIBAL REMEDIES, EXHAUSTION, AND STATE COURTS
Pete Heidepriem*
A bedrock feature of sovereignty is a court exercising jurisdiction. 1 For
Native nations, this is at risk. Through its judicial institution, a sovereign
nation supports the force and effect of its laws, promotes respect for
authority, and maintains culture.2 A rule in federal law, which this Article
calls the “tribal remedies doctrine,” provides vital support to tribal
judiciaries: it requires litigants to exhaust tribal court remedies before
pursuing claims in a nontribal court. While the doctrine is mandatory in
federal court, state courts across the country have shown different
perspectives on whether it applies to them. With growing disorder among
state courts, tribal court authority varies throughout the country.
Considering the importance of courts in Native nations, this result is not
acceptable. Establishing a uniform approach is critical to supporting tribal
sovereignty and preventing arbitrary geography from determining each
tribe’s authority. U.S. Supreme Court precedent, with special attention to
Iowa Mutual, requires state courts to apply the tribal remedies doctrine.
Separating the doctrine from the legal rules of administrative exhaustion
and abstention confirms this conclusion and reveals that a pending tribal
court action is not required before applying the tribal remedies doctrine in
state courts.
I. Introduction
In 1985, the United States Supreme Court decided National Farmers and
first announced the rule that litigants must exhaust tribal remedies before

`
* Pete Heidepriem is an attorney in South Dakota, where he litigates a variety of civil
cases and serves as a tribal prosecutor for the Lower Brule Sioux Tribe. For thoughtful edits
and interest in this article, thanks to the American Indian Law Review. Thanks as well to the
people who took the time to read this in its very early forms: Judge Jeffrey Viken, Judge
Patricia Sullivan, Eric Schlimgen, Alexander Ball, and the sharpest reader the author knows,
Kelly Wong.
1. See Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1987).
2. Robert D. Cooter & Wolfgang Fikentscher, Indian Common Law: The Role of
Custom in American Indian Tribal Courts (Part I of II), 46 AM. J. COMP. L. 287, 293 (1998);
Frank Pommersheim & Sherman Marshall, Liberation, Dreams, and Hard Work: An Essay
on Tribal Court Jurisprudence, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 411, 429–34.
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pressing their cases in a nontribal court.3 Most courts now refer to the rule
as the tribal court exhaustion doctrine. Since National Farmers, the
Supreme Court has provided further comment on the rule only a few times. 4
As lower courts applied the doctrine, its general outline and underlying
rationales became settled law, but the finer contours proved to be less
straightforward. Two questions emerged as particularly divisive. First, does
the doctrine, originally directed at federal courts, apply to state courts? And
second, is a pending tribal court suit a prerequisite to invoking the doctrine?
Courts and scholars come to many different conclusions on these
questions. To varying degrees, courts in eighteen states have substantively
addressed the doctrine’s applicability.5 The Utah Supreme Court’s 2017
decision in Harvey v. Ute Tribe is the latest comprehensive analysis of this
question in a state court.6 Many more state and federal court decisions sort
through the necessity of a pending case in tribal court. Since 2009, the
Supreme Court declined to hear two cases presenting the issue of the
doctrine’s state court application.7 The most recent instance was Harvey,
and before the Supreme Court denied that petition for writ of certiorari in
January 2019, it issued an order inviting a brief from the Office of the
United States Solicitor General setting out the views of the United States. 8
The Solicitor General filed a brief in December 2018, recommending denial
of the petition and providing thorough and previously unknown positions
on these two key issues of the doctrine; specifically, that the doctrine might
apply to state courts, and that it likely requires an already-filed tribal case.9
Names are important, so a point about them must be made at the outset.
Sometimes courts establish and label a legal doctrine, and as the doctrine
develops, a gap grows between the name and the substantive principles. For
3. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 855–57
(1985).
4. See, e.g., Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14–19; Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438,
448–53 (1997); see also Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001); El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v.
Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 483–85 (1999).
5. See infra Part III; see infra Appendix I.
6. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 416 P.3d
401, cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019).
7. Harvey, 139 S. Ct. 784; Coushatta Tribe of La. v. Meyer & Assocs., Inc., 556 U.S.
1166 (2009).
8. U.S. Supreme Court, Order List: 585 U.S. (June 25, 2018), https://www.supreme
court.gov/orders/courtorders/062518zor_g3bh.pdf.
9. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 416 P.3d 401 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at
*12, *18; see infra Section III.D.5(a)(2).
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instance, the doctrine of fraudulent joinder is widely described as a
misnomer. 10 It relates to pleading strategies to avoid federal jurisdiction, not
actual fraud.11 Similarly, using the title “exhaustion of tribal remedies”
breeds confusion because it brings to mind the well-established doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies. 12 This disconnect has prompted
scholars and judges to frequently discuss them together.13 Later, this Article
conducts a side-by-side analysis of the two doctrines and explains some
core distinctions.14 From this point on, the Article will use the terms “tribal
remedies doctrine,” “tribal exhaustion,” or simply, “the doctrine” to address
this issue. The reasoning that follows seeks to provide a basis for this name
adjustment and highlight a path forward for preserving doctrinal integrity. 15
In Part II, this Article sets forth the tribal remedies doctrine, with a brief
history of its roots and discussion of the leading Supreme Court cases. Part
III lays out the assortment of state court decisions engaging with the
doctrine, giving special emphasis to the Harvey case. Next, Part IV
contrasts the doctrine with the legal rules of administrative exhaustion and
abstention to show that the doctrine lacks a fitting analog. Parts V and VI
respectively establish the positions that the tribal remedies doctrine applies
to state courts and that a pending tribal court case need not be a
prerequisite.

10. Schur v. L.A. Weight Loss Ctrs., Inc., 577 F.3d 752, 763 n.9 (7th Cir. 2009) (“As
many courts have noted, the term ‘fraudulent joinder’ is a bit of a misnomer—the doctrine
requires neither fraud nor joinder.”) (citations omitted).
11. James F. Archibald III, Note, Reintroducing “Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent
Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1387 (1992); see also Matthew J. Richardson, Clarifying and
Limiting Fraudulent Joinder, 58 FLA. L. REV. 119, 130 n.62 (2006).
12. See infra Part IV for a discussion of the administrative exhaustion doctrine.
13. See id.
14. The Article also compares two abstention doctrines: Colorado River and Younger.
See id. As discussed infra, separating out these different legal rules elucidates the roots of
the tribal remedies doctrine and whether it has a role in state courts. Changing the name to
the tribal remedies doctrine is essential to achieving greater analytical clarity.
15. Speaking of names, this Article uses the legal terms of art “Indian” and “Indian
Country” where necessary. “The word ‘Indian’ has become a legal term of art with varying
definitions depending on the context.” St. Cloud v. United States, 702 F. Supp. 1456, 1460
(D.S.D. 1988); see also F.T.C. v. Payday Fin., LLC, 935 F. Supp. 2d 926, 929 n.1 (D.S.D.
2013). See generally 18 U.S.C. § 1151 (2018) (defining “Indian country”); COHEN’S
HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 3.03, at 170–83 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2012) [hereinafter COHEN ] (defining “Indian”); id. § 3.04, at 183–202 (defining “Indian
country”); Ryan Fortson, Advancing Tribal Court Criminal Jurisdiction in Alaska, 32
ALASKA L. REV. 93, 108–09 (2015) (describing categories of land within Indian Country).
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II. The Tribal Remedies Doctrine
A. Brief Background on Tribal Courts
Beyond dispute: Native nations are sovereigns whose existence and
powers preceded the creation of the United States government. 16 Since the
founding of the United States, there has been an ongoing process of
determining the relationship and balance of power between tribes and the
federal government.17 Two principles underlie the development of that
balance: first, the federal government’s trust responsibility to tribes, and
second, the federal policy of supporting tribal self-government.18 Three
Supreme Court decisions authored by Chief Justice John Marshall set the
groundwork for the trust responsibility—Johnson v. M’Intosh; Cherokee
Nation v. Georgia; and Worcester v. Georgia.19 A key aspect of Cherokee
Nation was the decision to “denominate[]” Native nations as “domestic
dependent nations,”20 which continues to be at the front of federal Indian
law today.21 Central to this “dependent” status is Congress’ plenary control
over tribal authority. 22 For example, federal courts have recognized the
tribes’ inherent immunity from suit—a fundamental feature of
sovereignty—for over one century, and the default position is that tribes are
immune from suit unless Congress unequivocally expresses its intent to
abrogate that power.23 The trust responsibility “encourages federal
facilitation of the development of tribal institutions and infrastructure,” in
part by “providing impetus for legislation furthering, among other issues,
Indian education, health care, and self-governance.”24
16. Michigan v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788 (2014).
17. See Samuel E. Ennis & Caroline P. Mayhew, Federal Indian Law and Tribal
Criminal Justice in the Self-Determination Era, 38 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 421, 425–32 (20132014).
18. See id. at 425–26.
19. Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832). For a more indepth description of the cases, see Fortson, supra note 15, at 105–08; id. at 114 (“From the
Marshall Trilogy we get the underlying principles of much of subsequent American Indian
law: American Indians have limited title to their land in the form of ‘aboriginal title’; the
federal government has a trust relationship obligation toward American Indians; and federal
Indian law is supreme over that of states.”).
20. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 17.
21. Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788.
22. Id.
23. Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 58 (1978) (citing Turner v. United
States, 248 U.S. 354, 358 (1919)); Bay Mills, 572 U.S. at 788.
24. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 425–26.
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The United States’ current support for tribal self-government was a
“direct response to the so-called Termination Era of the 1940s and
1950s[.]”25 During that era, “Congress moved to withdraw responsibility for
a number of Indian tribes, along with it recognition of their special legal
status; attempted to extend state jurisdiction over many more tribes; and
ultimately sought to assimilate all Indians into the broader polity.” 26
Congress expressed the country’s self-governance policy in the Indian SelfDetermination and Education Assistance Act, which promotes tribal control
over local law enforcement, the Bureau of Indian Affairs, and the Indian
Health Service. 27 The Supreme Court’s creation of the tribal remedies
doctrine accords with this overarching policy. 28 Congress now prioritizes
“enhancing tribal court systems and improving access to those systems [to]
serve[] the dual Federal goals of tribal political self-determination and
economic self-sufficiency.”29
While these general principles still guide today’s interpretations of
federal Indian law, tribal courts existed before the country’s founding. 30
The Supreme Court opinions Chief Justice Marshall penned in the early
1800s acknowledged tribal judicial systems.31 Like their state and federal
counterparts, tribal courts play a vital role in tribal government—the
resolution of disputes and the interpretation of laws. 32 Congress and the
federal courts, however, have placed certain limitations on the jurisdiction
of tribal courts.33 With respect to civil jurisdiction, cases arising in Indian
Country between Indian people or against an Indian defendant will
generally be subject to the tribal court’s exclusive jurisdiction.34 The
25. Id. at 426 (quoting Bethany R. Berger, Williams v. Lee and the Debate over Indian
Equality, 109 MICH. L. REV. 1463, 1466 (2011)).
26. Id.
27. 25 U.S.C. §§ 5301–5423 (2018); see Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 426–27.
28. Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14–18 (1987).
29. 25 U.S.C. § 3651(7) (2018).
30. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 298–302.
31. Id. at 299–300; Blake A. Watson, The Curious Case of Disappearing Federal
Jurisdiction over Federal Enforcement of Federal Law: A Vehicle for Reassessment of the
Tribal Exhaustion/Abstention Doctrine, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 531, 547–49 (1997).
32. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 299–302; Tribal Courts, TRIBAL CT.
CLEARINGHOUSE, https://www.tribal-institute.org/lists/justice.htm (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
33. Because the subtleties of tribal court jurisdiction are not the centerpiece of this
Article, it does not delve into the many permutations of facts that raise questions about
whether tribal courts can exercise authority. This brief overview covers what is necessary for
an engaged discussion of the tribal remedies doctrine.
34. Sanders v. Robinson, 864 F.2d 630, 632 (9th Cir. 1988); see 42 C.J.S. Indians § 62
(2010).
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Supreme Court’s decision in Montana v. United States “is the pathmarking
case concerning tribal civil authority over nonmembers.”35 In Montana, the
Court delineated
a general rule that, absent a different congressional direction,
Indian tribes lack civil authority over the conduct of
nonmembers on non-Indian land within a reservation, subject to
two exceptions: The first exception relates to nonmembers who
enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members; the
second concerns activity that directly affects the tribe’s political
integrity, economic security, health, or welfare. 36
As to criminal jurisdiction, the inherent power of a tribe provides its
courts with jurisdiction over Indian people in Indian Country. 37 With the
exception of the jurisdiction granted through the Violence Against Women
Act, non-Indian people in Indian Country are not subject to tribal court
criminal jurisdiction.38 Federal courts have jurisdiction over much of the
crimes committed in Indian Country. The General Crimes Act applies
federal jurisdiction to Indian Country as it pertains to federal enclaves like
federal courthouses and military bases. 39 And the Major Crimes Act
establishes federal jurisdiction over certain felonies committed in Indian
Country. 40 Whether a state court may exercise criminal jurisdiction over
crimes in Indian Country depends on the particular state. Congress passed
Public Law 280 in 1953, which “required certain state governments to
assume what would otherwise be federal criminal jurisdiction over Indian

35. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 445 (1997); see Montana v. United States,
450 U.S. 544 (1981).
36. Strate, 520 U.S. at 446.
37. See Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 432. The tribal remedies doctrine does not
concern itself with criminal jurisdiction, so the overview provided here is for the purpose of
giving full context to the function of tribal courts and their relationship with state and federal
courts.
38. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 422; see Violence Against Women
Reauthorization Act of 2013 tit. IX, § 904, 25 U.S.C. § 1304 (2018).
39. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 429.
40. Id. at 429 n.49 (“These fourteen crimes are murder, manslaughter, kidnapping,
maiming, a felony under chapter 109A [crimes of sexual abuse], incest, assault with intent to
commit murder, assault with a dangerous weapon, assault resulting in serious bodily injury,
an assault against an individual who has not attained the age of sixteen years, felony child
abuse or neglect, arson, burglary, and robbery.”) (citing 18 U.S.C. § 1153 (2018)).
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country.”41 Other specified states could elect to assume the same authority,
which requires consent of the tribe pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights
Act. 42
This brief background shows that the balance between tribal, state, and
federal courts is complicated and in constant development. The Supreme
Court’s decision in Williams v. Lee proved to be an essential moment in
history that teed up the creation of the tribal remedies doctrine. 43 In 1959,
the Court issued Williams v. Lee, a case where the Arizona state courts
exercised jurisdiction over a dispute for goods sold from a non-Indian
person to a Navajo tribal member on the Navajo Nation. 44 The state court
refused to dismiss the case on jurisdictional grounds, and the tribal member
appealed to the Supreme Court arguing that the suit should be in tribal
court.45 The Supreme Court unanimously reversed. 46 The Court held that
Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Worcester v. Georgia and the cases
flowing from that decision establish the principle that, “absent governing
Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state action
infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws and be
ruled by them.”47 Finding it “immaterial” that the respondent was not a
tribal member, the Court concluded “[t]here can be no doubt that to allow
the exercise of state jurisdiction here would undermine the authority of the
tribal courts over Reservation affairs and hence would infringe on the right
of the Indians to govern themselves.”48
Following the Supreme Court’s Williams v. Lee decision, the definitive
moment for the tribal remedies doctrine came with its formal announcement
in National Farmers.

41. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 430. Public Law 280 also grants state courts
concurrent authority over some civil cases where tribal courts have jurisdiction. See COHEN,
supra note 15, § 6.04[3][b][i], at 539–40.
42. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 430–31 (citing Carole Goldberg & Duane
Champagne, Is Public Law 280 Fit for the Twenty-First Century? Some Data at Last, 38
CONN. L. REV. 697, 699–701 (2006)).
43. 358 U.S. 217 (1959).
44. Id. at 217–18.
45. Id.
46. Id. at 223.
47. Id. at 218–20.
48. Id. at 223.
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B. National Farmers
National Farmers was a case grounded in federal question jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1331.49 The federal issue was “whether an Indian tribe
retains the power to compel a non-Indian property owner to submit to the
civil jurisdiction of a tribal court.”50 The case arose from a motorcycle
striking and injuring Leroy Sage, a member of the Crow Tribe, in the
parking lot of a school located on land owned by Montana but within the
exterior boundaries of the Crow Indian Reservation. 51
Sage commenced a lawsuit against the school district, an arm of the
state, in Crow Tribal Court.52 After process was served, the defendant did
not take action and eventually the tribal court entered final judgment in
Sage’s favor.53 To keep the judgment from taking effect, the school and its
insurer initiated an action in U.S. District Court for the District of Montana,
seeking a temporary restraining order. 54 The district court issued a
temporary restraining order blocking the tribal court’s judgment and its
exercise of jurisdiction over the case Sage filed. 55 Later, the district court
imposed a preliminary injunction against execution of the Crow Tribal
Court’s judgment and determined that the tribal court lacked subject matter
jurisdiction.56 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed
because it determined that the district court lacked an adequate basis for
jurisdiction over the case.57 One circuit judge dissented in part and
concurred in the result, finding that the district court had jurisdiction under
§ 1331, but that the case should still be dismissed because the insurer and
school district failed to exhaust tribal court remedies by appealing the tribal
court judgment.58

49. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under
the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). This is one
of the two statutory bases for federal court subject matter jurisdiction; the other is diversity
jurisdiction. See infra note 73; Iowa Mutual Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987)
(discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1332).
50. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 852 (1985).
51. Id. at 847.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 847–48.
54. Id. at 848.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 848–49.
57. Id. at 849.
58. Id.
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The Supreme Court unanimously reversed the Ninth Circuit.59 The Court
held that the “question whether an Indian tribe retains the power to compel
a non-Indian property owner to submit to the civil jurisdiction of a tribal
court is one that must be answered by reference to federal law and is a
‘federal question’ under § 1331.”60 In approaching the case’s federal
question, the Supreme Court determined that the tribal court had a
legitimate claim to jurisdiction. 61 The Court explained that “the existence
and extent of a tribal court’s jurisdiction” is an inquiry that “will require a
careful examination of tribal sovereignty, the extent to which that
sovereignty has been altered, divested, or diminished, as well as a detailed
study of relevant statutes, Executive Branch policy as embodied in treaties
and elsewhere, and administrative or judicial decisions.”62 “[T]hat
examination[,]” the Court held, “should be conducted in the first instance in
the Tribal Court itself.”63
The Court provided three reasons for this determination. First, Congress’
policy of “supporting tribal self-government and self-determination . . .
favors a rule that will provide the forum whose jurisdiction is being
challenged the first opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal bases for
the challenge.”64 Second, “the orderly administration of justice in the
federal court will be served by allowing a full record to be developed in the
Tribal Court before either the merits or any question concerning appropriate
relief is addressed.”65 When “the federal court stays its hand until after the
Tribal Court has had a full opportunity to determine its own jurisdiction[,]”
the tribal judicial system has the chance “to rectify any errors it may have
made.”66 And third, this rule will “encourage tribal courts to explain to the
parties the precise basis for accepting jurisdiction, and will also provide
other courts with the benefit of their expertise in such matters in the event
of further judicial review.”67
National Farmers also established three exceptions. First, a party need
not litigate in tribal court if the invocation of tribal jurisdiction “is
59. Id. at 828.
60. Id. at 852.
61. Id. at 853–56.
62. Id. at 855–56.
63. Id. at 856.
64. Id. (citing, inter alia, Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 223 (1959)); see supra notes
44–48 (citing Williams v. Lee).
65. Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856.
66. Id. at 857.
67. Id.
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motivated by a desire to harass or is conducted in bad faith.”68 Second,
there is no need to proceed in tribal court when it “is patently violative of
express jurisdictional prohibitions.”69 And third, exhaustion is not necessary
if it “would be futile because of the lack of an adequate opportunity to
challenge the [tribal] court’s jurisdiction.”70
The Court finished with procedural guidance to lower courts. If a lower
court finds that tribal exhaustion did not occur, the lower court may dismiss
or stay the case “pending the development of further Tribal Court
proceedings.”71 After the tribal judicial process runs its course, the federal
trial court may review the final decision. 72
C. Iowa Mutual
In 1987, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Iowa Mutual, the next
authoritative decision regarding tribal exhaustion. Iowa Mutual came before
the Court on the question of whether the tribal remedies doctrine applies to
a case where the federal trial court exercises diversity jurisdiction pursuant
to 28 U.S.C. § 1332.73 Like National Farmers, the case started with a motor
vehicle accident in Montana.74 Edward LaPlante, a member of the Blackfeet
Indian Tribe, worked on a ranch within the Blackfeet Indian Reservation’s
boundaries and filed suit against his employer and its insurer in Blackfeet
Tribal Court to recover for his injuries. 75 The tribal court denied the
insurer’s motion to dismiss the case for lack of jurisdiction; instead of
waiting for a decision on the merits and appealing, the insurer initiated a
federal court action in the District of Montana claiming jurisdiction based
on diversity of citizenship under § 1332.76 The federal case sought a court
declaration that the insurer did not have to pay for LaPlante’s injuries. 77
68. Id. at 856 n.21 (quoting Juidice v. Vail, 430 U.S. 327, 338 (1977)); see also R.
Mitchell McGrew, Note, Analysis of a Bias-Based Exception to the Doctrine of Exhaustion
in Wilson v. Bull, 39 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 617, 624 (2014-2015).
69. Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856 n.21.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 857.
72. Id.
73. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 11 (1987); see 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)
(2018) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs,
and is between . . . citizens of different States . . . .”).
74. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 11.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 12–13.
77. Id.
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When LaPlante moved to dismiss the case on subject matter jurisdiction
grounds, the district court granted the motion and highlighted the need to
exhaust tribal remedies. 78 The Ninth Circuit affirmed, and the Supreme
Court granted certiorari.79
At the outset, the Court reemphasized the core of the doctrine—”the
Federal Government’s longstanding policy of encouraging tribal selfgovernment.”80 Integral to this policy, “tribes retain ‘attributes of
sovereignty over both their members and their territory,’ to the extent that
sovereignty has not been withdrawn by federal statute or treaty.”81 Using
state sovereignty to illustrate this point, Iowa Mutual explained that the
“federal policy favoring tribal self-government operates even in areas
where state control has not been affirmatively pre-empted by federal
statute.”82 The Court then echoed Williams v. Lee’s holding that, “absent
governing Acts of Congress, the question has always been whether the state
action infringed on the right of reservation Indians to make their own laws
and be ruled by them.”83
Building on that foundation, the Court stated, “Tribal courts play a vital
role in tribal self-government, and the Federal Government has consistently
encouraged their development.”84 To underscore this point, the Court
highlighted that, “[i]f state-court jurisdiction over Indians or activities on
Indian lands would interfere with tribal sovereignty and self-government,
the state courts are generally divested of jurisdiction as a matter of federal
law.”85
The Court then turned to the issue presented and held that exhaustion in
tribal courts is necessary when jurisdiction is based on § 1332. 86 In fact,
“[r]egardless of the basis for jurisdiction,” the rule articulated in National
Farmers requires that the case go to tribal court. 87 It is the “unconditional
access” to a federal forum outside of the tribal judiciary that generates
“direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the [tribal

78. Id. at 13.
79. Id. at 13–14.
80. Id. at 14.
81. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 577 (1975)).
82. Id.
83. Id. (internal alteration omitted) (quoting Williams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217, 220
(1959)).
84. Id. at 14–15 (citation omitted).
85. Id. at 15 (citing Williams, 358 U.S. at 220).
86. Id. at 16.
87. Id.
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courts’] authority over reservation affairs.”88 Elaborating on this holding,
Iowa Mutual found that “[a]djudication of such matters by any nontribal
court also infringes upon tribal law-making authority, because tribal courts
are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.”89
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit’s determination that there
was no subject matter jurisdiction. Explaining National Farmers as a case
that announced a “prudential rule[,]” the Court held that “considerations of
comity direct that tribal remedies be exhausted.”90 So pursuing tribal court
remedies “is required as a matter of comity, not as a jurisdictional
prerequisite.”91 Iowa Mutual found that this made the doctrine “analogous
to principles of abstention.”92
Additionally, Iowa Mutual provided some practical clarifications. It
made clear that the completion of appellate review in the tribe’s judiciary is
necessary.93 And the Court reaffirmed National Farmers’ holding that
federal courts have authority to review tribal court jurisdictional
determinations after exhaustion.94
Only Justice John Paul Stevens wrote a separate opinion, which
concurred in part and dissented in part. Although the opinion concurred
with the majority that there was subject matter jurisdiction, Justice Stevens
dissented from the exhaustion analysis. 95 In Justice Stevens’ view, the fact
of concurrent jurisdiction between federal and tribal courts is not sufficient
for mandating exhaustion of the tribal judicial process. 96 Because the
insurer’s federal case related to “the coverage of the insurance policy[,]”

88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 15, 21 n.14.
91. Id. at 21 n.8.
“Comity,” in the legal sense, is neither a matter of absolute obligation, on the
one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good will, upon the other. But it is the
recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative,
executive or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to
international duty and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.
Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court for S. Dist., 482 U.S. 522,
544 (1987) (quoting Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 163–64 (1895)).
92. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16 n.8 (citing Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v.
United States, 424 U.S. 800, 819 (1976)); see infra Part III.
93. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16–17.
94. Id. at 19.
95. Id. at 20–21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
96. Id.
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Justice Stevens concluded it “raises no question concerning the jurisdiction
of the Blackfeet Tribal Court.”97
The dissenting aspect of the opinion understood the National Farmers
decision to turn on the fact that a litigant is actively challenging tribal court
jurisdiction.98 It noted that “a similar exhaustion requirement [is enforced]
in cases challenging the jurisdiction of state tribunals.”99 “[A]s between
state and federal courts,” Justice Stevens explained, “the general rule is that
‘the pendency of an action in the state court is no bar to proceedings
concerning the same matter in the Federal court having
jurisdiction . . . .’”100 By requiring tribal exhaustion without a direct
challenge to tribal jurisdiction, Justice Stevens found the Court advanced
“the anomalous suggestion that the sovereignty of an Indian tribe is in some
respects greater than that of the State of Montana.”101
D. Strate
The last robust discussion of the tribal remedies doctrine by the Supreme
Court came in the 1997 decision Strate v. A-1 Contractors. The case arose
from an automobile collision between Gisela Fredericks and Lyle Stockert
on a highway in North Dakota.102 It occurred at a point on the road within
the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation, in a stretch of highway over which
the United States granted North Dakota a right-of-way.103 While neither
driver was a tribal member, Fredericks’ late husband and her five children
were members of the Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Indian
Reservation.104
Fredericks sued Stockert, his employer, and the employer’s insurer in the
tribal court of the Three Affiliated Tribes. 105 The suit included a loss of
97. Id. at 22
98. Id. at 21–22.
99. Id. at 21.
100. Id. at 22 (quoting McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 282 (1910)).
101. Id.
102. Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442–43 (1997).
103. Id.
104. Id. at 443. The tribes are also known as the Mandan, Hidatsa, and Arikara Nation or
the MHA Nation. Our Tribe, MHA NATION, https://www.mhanation.com/ (last visited Mar.
16, 2020). This Article refers to the tribal nation as the Three Affiliated Tribes. See Indian
Entities Recognized and Eligible to Receive Services from the United States Bureau of
Indian Affairs, 81 Fed. Reg. 5019–25 (Jan. 29, 2016).
105. Strate, 520 U.S. at 443–44. For this discussion, the Article refers to Stockert, his
employer, and the employer’s insurer collectively as A-1 Contractors. When the automobile
collision occurred, Stockert was driving a gravel truck A-1 Contractors owned. Id.
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consortium claim advanced by Fredericks’ children. 106 A-1 Contractors
argued there was no subject matter jurisdiction and moved to dismiss. 107
The tribal court denied the motion, which was later affirmed when the
jurisdictional determination was appealed to the Northern Plains Intertribal
Court of Appeals.108
A-1 Contractors filed a federal lawsuit challenging the tribal
proceedings, and once that case made its way to the Supreme Court, the
core issue was whether the tribal court could exercise jurisdiction over
Fredericks’ case.109 To answer that, the Supreme Court had to apply its
Montana decision, which provides the decisive test for the limits of tribal
civil authority.110 The Court’s decisions in National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual became part of Strate’s analysis because Fredericks argued that
those cases control and “broadly confirm tribal-court civil jurisdiction over
claims against nonmembers arising from occurrences on any land within a
reservation.”111 In rejecting Fredericks’ position, the Court traced the
contours of National Farmers and Iowa Mutual.112
The Court addressed National Farmers first. While National Farmers
recognized “that tribal courts have more extensive jurisdiction in civil cases
than in criminal proceedings, and . . . the need to inspect relevant statutes,
treaties, and other materials” in assessing tribal court authority, Strate made
clear that no part of National Farmers “limit[s] Montana’s instruction.”113
Rather, National Farmers set forth “a prudential exhaustion rule, in
deference to the capacity of tribal courts to explain to the parties the precise
basis for accepting or rejecting jurisdiction.”114
Turning to Iowa Mutual, the Court indicated the 1987 decision rested on
the proposition that “[r]espect for tribal self-government made it
appropriate to give the tribal court a full opportunity to determine its own
106. Id.
107. Id. at 444.
108. See id. at 445.
109. Id. at 442, 444.
110. See supra Section II.A.
111. Strate, 520 U.S. at 448.
112. Fredericks, along with the United States as amicus curiae, also argued that because
the Court decided Montana in the context of tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers
(i.e., issuance of hunting licenses), it does not squarely limit the adjudicatory authority of
tribes. Id. at 447–48. Strate dismissed the argument. Id. at 453. The Court held that “[w]hile
Montana immediately involved regulatory authority, the Court broadly addressed the
concept of inherent sovereignty.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Id. at 449.
114. Id. at 450 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
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jurisdiction.”115 Strate refused, however, to accept the argument that Iowa
Mutual means “the Montana rule does not bear on tribal-court adjudicatory
authority in cases involving nonmember defendants.”116 The Court clarified
Iowa Mutual as holding the following: “where tribes possess authority to
regulate the activities of nonmembers, civil jurisdiction over disputes
arising out of such activities presumptively lies in the tribal courts.”117
E. Remaining Decisions
Since National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and Strate, the Supreme Court
has provided little guidance on the tribal remedies doctrine. The Court
decided Neztsosie in 1999, which thoughtfully analyzed National Farmers
before ultimately finding that the doctrine was inapplicable because “the
comity rationale for tribal exhaustion normally appropriate to a tribal
court’s determination of its jurisdiction stops short of the Price-Anderson
Act,” the federal statute at issue, which contains an “unusual preemption
provision.”118
The 2001 decision of Nevada v. Hicks did not require tribal exhaustion
because the Court determined there was no tribal court jurisdiction. Hicks
described Strate as “add[ing] a broader exception” to the doctrine:
exhaustion is not necessary “‘when . . . it is plain that no federal grant
provides for tribal governance of nonmembers’ conduct on land covered by
Montana’s main rule,’” because it “would serve no purpose other than
delay.”119 While not the opinion of the Court, Justice Sandra Day
115. Id. at 451 (internal quotation marks omitted).
116. Id. at 451–52.
117. Id. at 453 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted).
118. El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484–85, 487 (1999) (“[T]he PriceAnderson Act transforms into a federal action ‘any public liability action arising out of or
resulting from a nuclear incident,’ § 2210(n)(2). The Act not only gives a district court
original jurisdiction over such a claim, but provides for removal to a federal court as of right
if a putative Price-Anderson action is brought in a state court. Congress thus expressed an
unmistakable preference for a federal forum, at the behest of the defending party, both for
litigating a Price-Anderson claim on the merits and for determining whether a claim falls
under Price-Anderson when removal is contested.”) (citations omitted).
119. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001). Rather than a “broader exception,” this
quoted portion of Strate may be understood as an explanation of how an exception
established in National Farmers may apply. In Strate, the quote cites to the National
Farmers footnote articulating the three exceptions. The Strate quote—holding that
exhaustion is unnecessary when the tribal court clearly lacks jurisdiction—fits within the
second National Farmers exception for cases where “the [tribal] action is patently violative
of express jurisdictional prohibitions.” Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21 (1985).
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O’Connor, in a concurrence joined by Justice Stevens and Justice Stephen
G. Breyer, explained National Farmers and Iowa Mutual as relating to state
courts—”In determining the relationship between tribal courts and state and
federal courts, we have developed a doctrine of exhaustion based on
principles of comity.”120
Since the cases discussed above, the Supreme Court has touched on the
tribal remedies doctrine in passing but has not tested its principles. 121 In the
meantime, state courts have been grappling with the Supreme Court’s
rulings, and the array of outcomes shows that the doctrine is subject to
different interpretations.
III. State Courts and the Doctrine’s Applicability
On the issue of whether the tribal exhaustion doctrine applies to state
courts, eighteen state courts have addressed the question to varying degrees
of depth.122 Five state courts held that the doctrine applies. Six might also
come to that determination, but their decisions have not engaged with the
doctrine such that they can be grouped with the five jurisdictions applying
tribal exhaustion, so these six are labeled as “maybe.” There are three state
courts that address the doctrine’s principles but do not decide the issue.
Finally, in four states, the courts held the doctrine does not apply. The
following section discusses these categories in reverse order, finishing with
the Utah Supreme Court’s Harvey decision. 123
A. Does Not Apply: 4
1. Oklahoma
The Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, the state’s intermediate
appellate court, held in Michael Minnis & Associates, P.C. v. Kaw Nation
that “the exhaustion doctrine does not apply in state court actions.”124 Prior
120. Hicks, 533 U.S. at 398 (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and concurring in the
judgment).
121. See, e.g., Carlsbad Tech., Inc. v. HIF Bio, Inc., 556 U.S. 635, 639 (2009).
122. See COHEN, supra note 15, § 6.04[3][c], at 559–61 (Nell Jessup Newton et al. eds.,
2012) (discussing some state courts that have addressed the doctrine); id. § 7.04[3], at 630–
36 (same).
123. Appendix I provides a visual depiction of the discussion in this section. Comparing
Appendix II, which displays the presence of tribes in the country state-by-state, to Appendix
I reveals that many states with tribes in their borders have yet to weigh in on the
applicability of the tribal remedies doctrine.
124. Michael Minnis & Assocs., P.C. v. Kaw Nation, 2004 OK CIV APP 36, ¶ 18, 90
P.3d 1009, 1014.
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to appeal, the trial judge dismissed the case against the Kaw Nation; the
appellate decision does not reveal the basis for dismissal, but the motion to
dismiss raised, inter alia, tribal sovereign immunity and exhaustion of tribal
remedies. 125 The Michael Minnis court did not provide a detailed
explanation for its conclusion on the tribal remedies doctrine. 126 However,
the court viewed the case as turning on the issue of sovereign immunity and
affirmed the trial judge’s dismissal order in concluding the “state court
action is barred” without “a valid, express waiver of tribal sovereign
immunity by contract, the tribal government or Congressional
authorization.”127
2. Louisiana
The Louisiana Supreme Court issued a 2008 decision where it declined
to apply the tribal remedies doctrine. 128 The court’s then-Chief Justice,
Pascal F. Calogero, Jr., concurred and specifically determined that the
doctrine is inapplicable.129 To support this conclusion, the concurrence cites
the Oklahoma Michael Minnis decision and the U.S. Supreme Court case
Kiowa Tribe of Oklahoma v. Manufacturing Technologies.130 The
concurrence discusses Kiowa Tribe at length, noting how the decision
centered on sovereign immunity and “does not even mention the exhaustion
of tribal remedies doctrine in relation to a suit against an Indian Tribe filed
in a state court.”131 “Based on that fact,” Chief Justice Calogero “would
find that the exhaustion doctrine does not apply in state courts.”132 Justice
Catherine D. Kimball, joined by now-Chief Justice Bernette J. Johnson,
issued a comprehensive dissenting opinion largely tracking the Connecticut
Supreme Court’s ruling in Drumm v. Brown. 133 Justice John L. Weimer
dissented separately and appeared to support applying the doctrine without

125. Id. ¶¶ 7–20, 90 P.3d at 1012–14.
126. Id. ¶¶ 13–20, 90 P.3d at 1013–14.
127. Id. ¶ 21, 90 P.3d at 1015.
128. Meyer & Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 2007-2256, p. 5 (La. 9/23/08); 992
So. 2d 446, 451–52.
129. Id., 992 So. 2d at 452 (Calogero, C.J., additionally concurring and assigning
additional reasons).
130. Id., 992 So. 2d at 452–53.
131. Id., 992 So. 2d at 452.
132. Id.
133. Id. at pp. 6–13, 992 So. 2d at 453–62 (Kimball, J. dissenting) (discussing Drumm v.
Brown, 716 A.2d 50 (Conn. 1998), a leading state court case adopting the tribal remedies
doctrine); see infra notes 175–78 and accompanying text.
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expressly saying so. 134 Justice Weimer concluded that the tribal court must
be the first to assess the sovereign immunity question, 135 but if there is a
waiver, “the matter can then be returned to state court.”136
3. Arizona
In Astorga v. Wing, an intermediate court in Arizona had a case where it
determined it need not implement the tribal remedies doctrine. 137 The case
involved “an Indian plaintiff fil[ing] suit in state court against a non-Indian
defendant” and an ongoing parallel case in tribal court.138 The plaintiffs
appealed the state trial court’s refusal to stay the state case, and the
reviewing court found that “there is no need to invoke the exhaustion
requirement to protect the ability of the tribal court to determine in the first
instance the facts and the law pertaining to whether it has jurisdiction[,]”
because “[t]he tribal court will presumably decide the jurisdictional issue in
the parallel proceeding that is before it, as the exhaustion doctrine
requires.”139 Citing a prior Arizona Supreme Court case, the court
concluded that “the principle of exhaustion recognized by federal courts in
this context does not similarly operate in Arizona state courts.”140
4. Washington
In Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., a Washington intermediate appellate
court found the tribal remedies doctrine inapplicable. 141 Maxa held that
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual were inapposite because, unlike Maxa,
those “cases involve federal jurisdiction issues[,]” and “[s]tate civil
adjudicatory authority over litigation involving tribe members, on the other

134. Id. at p. 13, 992 So. 2d at 462 (Weimer, J., dissenting) (“Because I believe this
threshold [sovereign immunity] question involving tribal law should be resolved by the tribal
court, I would find the tribal court had jurisdiction to initially determine the validity of the
agreements at issue.”).
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. 118 P.3d 1103, 1106–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005). Astorga is cited for this holding in
Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 93–94, 416
P.3d 401 (Himonas, J., concurring), and id. ¶ 123 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and
dissenting in part).
138. Astorga, 118 P.3d at 1107.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 1106 (citing State v. Zaman, 946 P.2d 459, 463 (Ariz. 1997)).
141. Maxa v. Yakima Petroleum, Inc., 924 P.2d 372, 373 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996). Maxa
is referred to for this proposition in Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 128 n.16 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part), and Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 61 n.11 (Conn. 1998).
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hand, is not specifically preempted by federal law.”142 The court
additionally held that its choice to exercise jurisdiction accorded with
Williams v. Lee, because the case involved a contract dispute the state had
an interest in resolving and doing so would not “interfere with reservation
self-government.”143
B. Not Decided or Unclear: 3
1. Mississippi
The Mississippi Supreme Court decided Harrison v. Boyd Miss., Inc., in
1997, and did not rule on the applicability of tribal exhaustion. 144 The court
“note[d] the line of Federal cases requiring the exhaustion of tribal
remedies prior to review by Federal Courts[,]” and found that “[s]ince no
companion case is pending in tribal court, this doctrine is not applicable in
the case sub judice.”145 Justice Fred L. Banks, Jr., concurred in part, which
Chief Justice Dan M. Lee joined, finding that the majority did not need to
resolve whether the tribal court had jurisdiction—that it was sufficient to
find the state court “did have jurisdiction and that no principle of comity
required that it relinquish that jurisdiction.”146 Justice James W. Smith, Jr.,
published a dissent urging the majority to embrace the tribal remedies
doctrine. 147 In Justice Smith’s view, “Under the doctrine of comity, the
recognition of the judicial independence of another sovereign, courts should
not exercise jurisdiction over civil cases where those cases are subject to
tribal jurisdiction, until tribal remedies have been exhausted.”148
2. New Mexico
New Mexico state courts have not made a clear decision on the doctrine
one way or the other. In Tempest Recovery Services, Inc. v. Belone, the
Supreme Court of New Mexico employed the Williams v. Lee infringement
test and found that the state court could exercise jurisdiction when it had
concurrent jurisdiction with the tribal court.149 Within its decision, the
Tempest Recovery court included a footnote “recogniz[ing]” that “federal
courts apply an ‘exhaustion doctrine,’ which allows for a tribal court to
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.

Maxa, 924 P.2d at 373.
Id. at 374.
Harrison v. Boyd Miss., Inc., 700 So. 2d 247, 251 n.3 (Miss. 1997).
Id.
Id. at 252 (Banks, J., concurring in part).
Id. at 254–55 (Smith, J., dissenting).
Id. at 254.
Tempest Recovery Servs., Inc. v. Belone, 74 P.3d 67, 69–72 (N.M. 2003).
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determine its jurisdiction before a federal court will exercise its own
jurisdiction in cases where concurrent jurisdiction may exist.”150 No further
comment on the doctrine followed.
But six years later, New Mexico’s intermediate appellate court decided
Martinez v. Cities of Gold Casino, where the parties directly raised the issue
of tribal exhaustion.151 The Martinez court determined it need “not reach
[the] argument concerning exhaustion of tribal remedies” because sovereign
immunity was not waived.152 Although this is not close to a ruling
embracing the doctrine, it is notable that, in the context of a party urging the
court to “adopt the exhaustion rule set forth in National Farmers[,]” the
court did not cite Tempest Recovery, instead treating the issue as unresolved
for New Mexico state courts.153
3. New York
A New York court addressed the tribal remedies doctrine and observed
that another state court has held that it applies as substantive federal law. 154
Even if the court “assum[ed] that the rule is a substantive federal law made
binding on state courts pursuant to the Supremacy Clause[,]” the court
“conclude[d] that it d[id] not apply to th[e] case because there [was] no
action pending in a Seneca Nation tribal court.”155
C. Maybe Applies: 6
1. Minnesota
The intermediate appellate courts of Minnesota apply the tribal remedies
doctrine. 156 In Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., however, Minnesota’s Supreme
Court discussed the doctrine as though it was a sub-component of the
150. Id. at 72 n.3.
151. Martinez v. Cities of Gold Casino, 215 P.3d 44, 53 (N.M. Ct. App. 2009).
152. Id.
153. Id.
154. Seneca v. Seneca, 741 N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) (citing Drumm v.
Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 61–64 (Conn. 1998)).
155. Id.
156. See, e.g., Matsch v. Prairie Island Indian Cmty., 567 N.W.2d 276, 278 (Minn. Ct.
App. 1997) (requiring tribal exhaustion); Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535
N.W.2d 379, 381 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (same); see also Lower Sioux Indian Cmty. v.
Kraus-Anderson Const. Co., No. A09-777, 2010 WL 696392, at *4 (Minn. Ct. App. Mar. 2,
2010) (same). Klammer makes the important point that the doctrine applies even if the state
court exercises jurisdiction based on Public Law 280, 535 N.W.2d at 383–84, because, as
Iowa Mutual held, the doctrine has relevance “[r]egardless of the basis for jurisdiction,”
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987).
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broader Williams v. Lee infringement principle. 157 Despite finding
concurrent jurisdiction between state and tribal courts, the court did not
require tribal exhaustion because there was no infringement under Williams
v. Lee.158
2. Idaho
The Supreme Court of Idaho observed in Coeur d’Alene Tribe v.
Johnson that the “[U.S.] Supreme Court has never specifically held that this
doctrine applies to the states, and it is unclear whether it does.”159 However,
the court went on to note “[t]he reasoning in Drumm is persuasive as it
analyzes the application of the exhaustion doctrine in a situation similar to
the present case.”160 The Johnson court especially embraced Drumm’s
conclusion that “the doctrine is only applicable when there is pending
litigation in tribal court.”161 Because there was no pending tribal case in
Johnson, the court concluded exhaustion was not applicable. 162
3. Iowa
While Iowa’s intermediate court of appeals did not formally adopt the
tribal remedies doctrine, it may have implicitly done so when it determined
that exhaustion was unnecessary because the futility exception applied. 163
4. Nebraska
In Thomas v. Thomas, the Supreme Court of Nebraska refused to reach
the merits because the case was moot.164 Thomas noted, however, that the
lower court “declined to exercise jurisdiction because appellant failed to
exhaust [his] Tribal Court remedies regarding the existence and extent of
the subject matter jurisdiction of the Coeur D’Alene Tribal Court and the
157. Gavle v. Little Six, Inc., 555 N.W.2d 284, 292 (Minn. 1996). See supra Section
II.A.
158. Gavle, 555 N.W.2d at 292. Drumm cites Gavle as a case finding “the exhaustion
doctrine is not applicable to state courts.” Drumm, 716 A.2d at 61 n.11.
159. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13, 18 (Idaho 2017) (citing Drumm, 716
A.2d at 61).
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 19.
163. Wasker, Dorr, Wimmer & Marcouiller, P.C. v. Bear, No. 04-1917, 2006 WL
3017875, at *4 (Iowa Ct. App. Oct. 25, 2006) (“We affirm denial of the motion to dismiss
for want of jurisdiction based upon the futility of attempting to try an issue in a nonexistent
tribal court.”).
164. Thomas v. Thomas, 453 N.W.2d 752, 754 (1990).
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District Court of Knox County, Nebraska relied upon the authority of
National Farmers.”165 Although the appellant challenged this
determination, the Thomas court made no comment on it, found the case
moot, and affirmed the lower court. 166
5. South Dakota
The Supreme Court of South Dakota quoted National Farmers in
addressing “the question of whether [it] has jurisdiction to review the
validity of tribal court proceedings[,]” and the court “acknowledge[d] that
the ‘forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged [should have] the first
opportunity to evaluate the factual and legal basis for the challenge.’” 167
The citation to National Farmers was followed with a parenthetical, which
noted that in that case the U.S. Supreme Court “declin[ed] to consider relief
until tribal court remedies are exhausted.”168 The court did not definitively
embrace the doctrine.
In Calvello v. Yankton Sioux Tribe, the Supreme Court of South Dakota
held in part that, if the appellant had a legitimate suit against the tribe, he
had to seek it in tribal court.169 The court supported this determination by
stating that “[i]n matters involving commercial relations, it has long been
acknowledged that ‘subject[ing] a dispute arising on a reservation . . . to a
forum other than the one they have established for themselves,’ may
‘undermine the authority of the tribal cour[t] . . . and hence . . . infringe on
the right of the Indians to govern themselves.’”170 This statement relied on a
string citation, which included National Farmers and two federal district
court cases with explanatory parentheticals suggesting the tribal remedies
doctrine applies to state courts.171
165. Id. (alteration in original) (citing Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).
166. Id.
167. In re Estate of Colombe, 885 N.W.2d 350, 357 (S.D. 2016) (alteration in original)
(quoting Nat’l Farmers Union, 471 U.S. at 856).
168. Id.
169. 1998 S.D. 107, ¶ 22, 584 N.W.2d 108, 116.
170. Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 59
(1978)).
171. Id. (citing Bowen v. Doyle, 880 F. Supp. 99, 123 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (even if state
court has jurisdiction and matter is not currently pending before tribal court, state courts
must abstain from hearing suits arising on reservations until after tribal courts have resolved
the issue); Smith v. Babbitt, 875 F. Supp. 1353, 1366–67 (D. Minn. 1995) (non-tribal court
must abstain from hearing matter arising on Indian land until plaintiff has exhausted
remedies in tribal court)). The parentheticals are presented as they appear verbatim in
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6. Wisconsin
In Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa
Indians, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin recognized that both the state and
tribe had legitimate claims to jurisdiction, so it “conclude[d] that principles
of comity in this situation required the circuit and tribal courts to confer for
purposes of jurisdiction allocation prior to proceeding to judgment.”172 The
court “remand[ed] to the circuit court to convene such a conference, at
which the respective courts will weigh considerations of comity and tribal
exhaustion to determine whether the judgments should be reopened for
purposes of jurisdiction allocation and retrial.”173 Teague does not
concretely hold that the doctrine applies in Wisconsin state court, but there
is the suggestion, and at least one commentator noticed. 174
D. Does Apply: 5
1. Connecticut
One of the leading state court cases adopting the tribal exhaustion
doctrine is the Connecticut Supreme Court’s 1998 decision in Drumm v.
Brown. 175 In evaluating National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and other relevant
cases, the Drumm court found “strong suggestions” that the doctrine
constitutes substantive federal law “binding in state courts pursuant to the
supremacy clause of the federal constitution.”176 Putting that question aside,
Calvello. However, a recent case that did not discuss the tribal remedies doctrine could cast
doubt on whether the doctrine applies in South Dakota. See also Stathis v. Marty Indian
Sch., 2019 S.D. 33, 930 N.W.2d 653 (finding federal law preempted state jurisdiction,
without deciding whether Williams v. Lee barred suit of former high school principal against
Marty Indian School; no discussion of tribal courts or exhaustion).
172. 2000 WI 79, ¶ 41, 612 N.W.2d 709, 720.
173. Id. at 720–21; Carol Tebben, Trifederalism in the Aftermath of Teague: The
Interaction of State and Tribal Courts in Wisconsin, 26 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 177, 181 (20012002) (“The case was remanded to the state trial court judge with instructions to hold a
conference with the tribal judge to determine, under principles of comity and
tribal exhaustion, which court should appropriately maintain jurisdiction of the litigation.”).
A subsequent decision from the Supreme Court of Wisconsin regarding this case referred to
the conference as “the comity conference.” Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior
Tribe of Chippewa Indians, 2003 WI 118, ¶ 5, 665 N.W.2d 899, 903.
174. Bryan Cahill, Note, Teague v. Bad River Band of Lake Superior Tribe of Chippewa
Indians: Bringing the Federal Exhaustion Rule of Tribal Remedies Home to Wisconsin
Courts, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 1291, 1324–25 (“By remanding, the court subtly suggested the
desired outcome—tribal remedies should have been exhausted.”).
175. 716 A.2d 50, 54–55 (Conn. 1998)).
176. Id. at 62–63.
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Drumm held that deference to “the federal policy of supporting tribal selfgovernment . . . counsels that [the court] also adopt the doctrine for the
courts of [Connecticut].”177 In addition, the Drumm court analyzed whether
a pending tribal court case is required before nontribal courts order
exhaustion, finding “that exhaustion is not required in the absence of a
pending action in the tribal court.”178
2. North Dakota
Without providing thorough analysis like Drumm, the Supreme Court of
North Dakota required exhaustion of tribal remedies in Fredericks.179
3. California
In an unpublished decision, a California intermediate appellate court
determined that the doctrine was applicable, simply stating it “applies in
state court as well as federal court.”180
4. Alaska
Within the specific context of an Indian Child Welfare Act child custody
proceeding, the Supreme Court of Alaska held that it adopts the doctrine
and “will not allow a party to challenge a tribal court’s judgment in an
ICWA-defined child custody proceeding in Alaska state court without first
exhausting available tribal court appellate remedies.”181

177. Id. at 63.
178. Id. at 64.
179. Fredericks v. Eide-Kirschmann Ford, Mercury, Lincoln, Inc., 462 N.W.2d 164, 169
(N.D. 1990); see also State ex rel. Olson v. Harrison, 2001 ND 99, ¶ 18, 627 N.W.2d 153,
158 (“In Fredericks, 462 N.W.2d at 168, we held Eide should have exhausted its tribal court
remedies . . . .”) (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9 (1987); Nat’l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845 (1985)).
180. Rivera v. Hopland Band of Pomo Indians Econ. Dev. Corp., No. A114858, 2007
WL 2310773, at *4 (Cal. Ct. App. Aug. 14, 2007) (“The doctrine applies even when a tribal
agency other than a tribal court arguably has jurisdiction . . . and applies in state court as
well as federal court . . . .”) (citation omitted). However, in a published decision from
California’s intermediate court, the court declined to decide whether the doctrine applies and
further found “exhaustion of tribal court remedies is not required when no tribal
court existed at the time the action was commenced.” Findleton v. Coyote Valley Band of
Pomo Indians, 238 Cal. Rptr. 3d 346, 354 (Cal. Ct. App. 2018), as modified (Sept. 26, 2018).
181. Simmonds v. Parks, 329 P.3d 995, 1007–08 (Alaska 2014).
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5. Utah
The Supreme Court of Utah’s decision in Harvey provides the most
recent comprehensive decision regarding the doctrine. 182 Because that
decision is a focal point of this Article, it is discussed below in detail.
a) Harvey v. Ute Tribe
(1) Utah Supreme Court decision
The genesis of the Harvey case involves the oil and gas industry in the
Uintah Basin and the industry’s reliance on land within the Uintah and
Ouray Reservation of the Ute Indian Tribe. 183 Ryan Harvey owns
businesses supplying “dirt, sand, and gravel” and leasing equipment to oil
and gas companies. 184 Harvey’s businesses are not on tribal land, but “the
items they sell and lease are often used on tribal land by the leasing or
buying companies.”185 Although Harvey’s “businesses did not operate
directly on tribal land,” a Commissioner with the Ute Tribal Employment
Rights Office (UTERO) required him to obtain a Ute Business License over
his objection.186 The Commissioner then claimed Harvey obtained a forged
license, but the two met and the Commissioner let go of that belief. 187
Harvey and the Commissioner had another interaction later where Harvey
understood the Commissioner to be asking for a bribe, which he did not
pay.188 Eventually, Harvey received a letter from UTERO revoking his
reservation access permit and alleging his businesses were operating in
violation of a UTERO ordinance. 189 UTERO also distributed a letter to oil
and gas companies indicating Harvey’s businesses lacked access permits
and warning that penalties would be imposed if other companies used
Harvey’s businesses. 190 Many stopped working with Harvey, so he sued in
Utah state court.191

182. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, 416 P.3d
401; see id. ¶¶ 91–108 (Himonas, J., concurring).
183. Id. ¶ 1 (majority opinion).
184. Id. ¶ 5.
185. Id.
186. Id. ¶ 6.
187. Id. ¶ 7.
188. Id. ¶ 8.
189. Id. ¶ 9.
190. Id. ¶ 10.
191. Id. ¶¶ 11–12.
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The lawsuit took aim at the Ute Tribe and tribal officials, claiming they
exceeded their jurisdiction and committed various torts.192 The defendants
filed motions to dismiss, including a motion arguing Harvey failed to
exhaust tribal remedies. 193 While the Utah trial court did not issue a direct
ruling on tribal exhaustion, the Utah Supreme Court found it “essentially
did so in substance” by stating that “Harvey’s claim that the tribal officials
exceeded the jurisdiction of the tribe or acted outside the scope of their
authority under tribal law must be addressed in the tribal court.”194 The
Utah Supreme Court took up that issue on appeal.
As a legal opinion, Harvey has a “somewhat unique character.”195 All
sitting members of the court concurred in the majority opinion, except two
justices dissented from the ruling on the tribal remedies doctrine. 196 That
ruling in the majority opinion had the support of the two members joining
the entirety of the opinion of the court, as well as a concurrence from
Justice Constandinos Himonas, who “concur[red] in all of the analysis in
the majority opinion and [wrote] separately to further explain his reasons
for joining.”197 Additionally, “[t]he majority opinion incorporate[d] Justice
Himonas’s concurring opinion.”198
On the issue of exhausting tribal remedies, the majority opinion began by
identifying the challenged actions of the Ute Tribe as central to its right to
self-govern because “the actions Harvey complain[ed] of relate to the
ability of the Ute Tribe to exclude non-Indians from their reservation.” 199
The majority isolated the three principles underlying the doctrine, finding
all three support applying the doctrine. 200 First, requiring exhaustion
promotes tribal self-government—”as a matter of comity, the tribe should
be given the first right to interpret the . . . letter [to oil and gas companies]
and determine the tribe’s jurisdiction” in that exercise of power.201 Second,
exhaustion is efficient because it allows the tribal court “to interpret the
tribe’s order and vet the factual challenge to the tribe’s jurisdiction as a

192. Id. ¶ 12.
193. Id.
194. Id. ¶ 13.
195. Id. ¶ 3.
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. Id.
199. Id. ¶ 43.
200. Id. ¶ 49 (analogizing the case to Burlington N. R.R. v. Crow Tribal Council, 940
F.2d 1239, 1246 (9th Cir. 1991)).
201. Id.
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matter of judicial economy.”202 And third, “forcing Harvey to litigate in
tribal court provides clarity to the parties and any reviewing court on how
the tribe views its own jurisdiction.”203 The majority would require
exhaustion despite the absence of a case pending in tribal court.204
Justice Himonas’s concurrence, which is an arm of the majority opinion,
expounded on the antecedent issue of whether to apply the tribal remedies
doctrine in the first place. According to Justice Himonas, the “express
language” of Iowa Mutual makes the doctrine applicable;205 specifically,
Iowa Mutual’s statement that exhaustion is necessary for “any nontribal
court.”206 Justice Himonas explained that requiring exhaustion accords with
the policy of limiting state control over tribes. 207 Otherwise, state courts
would be “in a superior position to federal courts in hearing cases that
implicate tribal jurisdiction[,]” which would “give rise to a scheme where
plaintiffs overwhelmingly chose to litigate in state court instead of tribal
court—a state of affairs that would wholly subvert the federal policy of
encouraging the development of tribal court systems.”208 Noting that a state
court’s “control over litigation that could also proceed in tribal court . . . has
the exact same effect on tribal self-determination as when a federal court
assumes such control[,]” Justice Himonas concluded, “[T]he tribal
exhaustion rule admits of no distinction between federal and state
courts . . . .”209
In contrast to the dissenting opinion, the concurrence stated that
analogizing the tribal remedies doctrine to exhaustion of administrative
remedies is inaccurate and fails to appreciate “tribes’ unique status and
history—a status and history that should inform how we construe legal
terms imported from other areas of law into the Indian law context.”210 The
concurrence also found tribal exhaustion is not akin to abstention because
that involves a court “balanc[ing] multiple factors, including judicial
economy concerns and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation.”211 Instead of
“a multifactorial, abstention-style balancing test to determine when
202. Id. ¶ 50.
203. Id.
204. Id. ¶ 51.
205. Id. ¶ 95 (Himonas, J., concurring).
206. Id. ¶ 93 (citing Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); Nevada v.
Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 398 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring)).
207. Id. ¶ 96 (Himonas, J., concurring).
208. Id. ¶ 97.
209. Id. ¶ 98.
210. Id. ¶ 103.
211. Id. ¶ 106.
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exhaustion is appropriate[,]” the tribal remedies doctrine mandates
exhaustion of tribal remedies. 212
Associate Chief Justice Thomas R. Lee, joined by Chief Justice Matthew
B. Durrant, issued an opinion dissenting from the majority’s tribal
exhaustion analysis. On tribal exhaustion, the dissent emphasized that the
U.S. Supreme Court “has never considered the important question
presented here.”213 Without “a controlling statute or binding precedent from
the U.S. Supreme Court,” the dissent took “to decid[ing] how to balance the
needed deference to the sovereignty and jurisdiction of the tribal courts.”214
The dissent determined that the doctrine established in National Farmers
and Iowa Mutual is “a matter of federal Indian law” that does not apply to
state courts.215 Drawing on Utah “common law authority[,]” the dissent
would “conclude that [Utah] courts should stay [their] exercise of
jurisdiction only after one of the parties has invoked the jurisdiction of the
tribal courts.”216 In the dissent’s view, the language Justice Himonas relied
on in Iowa Mutual is dicta that does not “extend to a case like” Harvey. 217
The dissent likened the tribal remedies doctrine to administrative
exhaustion; it stated that because exhaustion “is a principle that regulates
the timing of proceedings in tribunals that operate in a hierarchical
relationship,” it should not bind state courts because that structure does not
exist between state and tribal courts.218 Even if the holdings of National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual apply to state courts, the dissent “would not
interpret those cases to require exhaustion in the absence of a pending case
filed in tribal courts.”219
According to the dissent, the three reasons National Farmers articulated
as undergirding tribal exhaustion also support demanding a pending tribal
case.220 For instance, National Farmers was concerned with “the need to
allow the ‘forum whose jurisdiction is being challenged’” to assess its own
authority, but that concern does not manifest until a tribal case gets filed. 221
Within this discussion, the dissent compared the doctrine to abstention
212. Id. ¶ 107.
213. Id. ¶ 124 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
214. Id. ¶ 128.
215. Id. ¶ 117.
216. Id. ¶ 118.
217. Id. ¶ 121.
218. Id.
219. Id. ¶ 130.
220. Id. ¶¶ 132–141.
221. Id. ¶ 138 (quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S.
845, 856 (1985)).
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because they “are closely related doctrines” that are “based on concerns
regarding comity and deference to ongoing judicial proceedings.”222 The
dissent asserted that forcing the defendants “to file a declaratory suit in
tribal court[,]” which they so far “declined to file[,]” would “overrid[e]”
their “right of self-governance.”223
(2) U.S. Supreme Court Petition for Certiorari
Harvey sought review of the Utah Supreme Court’s decision by filing a
petition for writ of certiorari with the U.S. Supreme Court. The petition
presented two questions:
1. Whether the tribal remedies exhaustion doctrine, which
requires federal courts to stay cases challenging tribal
jurisdiction until the parties have exhausted parallel tribal
court proceedings, applies to state courts as well.
2. Whether the tribal remedies exhaustion doctrine requires
that nontribal courts yield to tribal courts when the parties
have not invoked the tribal court’s jurisdiction. 224
The petition claimed the Utah Supreme Court answered both questions
incorrectly, placing it in tension with various state and federal courts. 225
Much of the petition’s argument relied on Associate Chief Justice Lee’s
dissent.226 In support of Harvey’s petition, the State of Utah filed a brief as
amicus curiae.227 Utah focused on state sovereignty and argued that the
Harvey decision diminishes Utah’s sovereignty.228
Before ruling on the petition, the Supreme Court issued an order inviting
a brief from the Office of the Solicitor General to set out the views of the
United States.229 The Solicitor General argued for denial of the petition. 230
222. Id. ¶ 135.
223. Id. ¶ 142.
224. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray
Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2018) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 1327120, at *i.
225. Id. at *16–33.
226. Id.
227. Brief of the State of Utah as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners, Harvey v. UTE
Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2018) (No. 17-1301), 2018
WL 1850971.
228. Id. at *8–9.
229. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at
*1.
230. Id.
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On the first question presented, the government noted that Iowa Mutual’s
treatment of tribal exhaustion reveals that it “applies as a matter of ‘federal
policy’ when necessary to prevent ‘direct competition with the tribal courts’
by ‘any nontribal court’—which would appear to include a state court—on
matters of tribal ‘authority over reservation affairs.’”231 Despite state courts
resolving questions relating to tribal exhaustion differently, the government
asserted that, rather than squarely ruling on the issue like the Utah Supreme
Court, other relevant state court decisions “relied on multiple
considerations—often drawing simultaneously on related Indian-law
doctrines, such as the Williams v. Lee infringement test . . . in deciding
whether to stay state-court proceedings in favor of proceedings in tribal
court.”232 The government understood “[t]he differing outcomes in those
cases [as] more properly attributed to the courts’ consideration of casespecific factors.”233
Turning to the second question presented, the government contended
“the justification for abstaining in favor of tribal-court proceedings under
the specific rationales of National Farmers and [Iowa Mutual] would
appear ordinarily to depend on whether tribal-court proceeding are, in fact,
pending.”234 The government argued that without a pending “tribal-court
proceeding[,] . . . adjudication of the parties’ claims by a non-tribal court
would not create any ‘direct competition’ with tribal courts.”235 And “where
a non-Indian attempts to sue a tribe or tribal member in state court
concerning on-reservation conduct (whether or not there is a pending tribalcourt proceeding), any bar to the state court’s adjudication of the case
would normally be based . . . on Williams v. Lee,” and its ruling “that suits
against tribal members in state court involving on-reservation conduct are
generally barred.”236
The government also pointed out that the “Court has concluded that state
courts may resolve disputes involving tribes and tribal members concerning
access to a reservation, where the cause of action arose outside of Indian
country.”237 The Court additionally “approved the exercise of jurisdiction
by state courts over claims by Indians against non-Indians, even when those

231.
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.

Id. at *12 (quoting Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987)).
Id. at *18.
Id.
Id. at *12.
Id. (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16).
Id. at *12–13 (citation omitted).
Id. at *13.
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claims arose in Indian country.”238 Moreover, the government argued, a
state court is free to decide “suits that implicate tribal interests[,]” and, “if
necessary to resolve state-law claims[,]” it may interpret tribal law as it
would proceed “interpreting federal law or the law of another State.”239
The government also stated in its amicus brief that the Harvey case is not
a good candidate for resolving the questions presented.240 In discussing
what claims Harvey’s tribal case may need to include, the government
highlighted that no one argued against a state court “retaining jurisdiction
over claims over which it would otherwise have jurisdiction under Williams
v. Lee,” while calling “for a tribal court to decide specific questions within
its expertise—in a manner analogous to principles of primary jurisdiction or
certification of state-law issues to a state court.241 The government stated it
was “aware of no basis in federal law for disapproving that procedure.”242
After receiving the U.S. Solicitor General’s brief, the U.S. Supreme
Court denied the petition for writ of certiorari.243 As is customary, the Court
provided no explanation. 244
The remainder of this Article weighs the history and law set forth above,
and it establishes a new approach to interpreting and implementing the
tribal remedies doctrine, with a focus on state courts.
IV. Contrast with Administrative Exhaustion and Abstention
Courts often analyze the extent to which the tribal remedies doctrine
shares characteristics of other doctrines—specifically, exhaustion of
administrative remedies and abstention under Colorado River or Younger.
In each of these contexts, a court stays its hand or dismisses a case based on
the existence (or non-existence) of proceedings in a different forum.
Administrative exhaustion relates to the requirement that a claim run its
course through an agency prior to forming the basis for a lawsuit. For
example, if the U.S. Forest Service is negligent in carrying out controlled
burns and damages a farmer’s land, and the farmer wants to file a Federal
Tort Claims Act case, the farmer must first pursue the matter before the
238. Id. (citing Three Affiliated Tribes of the Fort Berthold Reservation v. Wold Eng’g,
P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 148 (1984)).
239. Id.
240. Id. at *20.
241. Id. at *21.
242. Id.
243. Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784
(2019).
244. Id.
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applicable federal agency. Two main purposes underpin administrative
exhaustion. First, it protects “administrative agency authority” by
discouraging “disregard of the agency’s procedures” and providing the
agency “an opportunity to correct its own mistakes” before a court gets
involved. 245 And second, it supports efficiency and the economical
resolution of claims involving agencies and may “produce a useful record
for subsequent judicial consideration.”246
Colorado River abstention is a rule where “federal courts may decline to
exercise their jurisdiction, in otherwise ‘exceptional circumstances,’ where
denying a federal forum would clearly serve an important countervailing
interest, for example, where abstention is warranted by considerations of
‘proper constitutional adjudication,’ ‘regard for federal-state relations,’ or
‘wise judicial administration.’”247 And Younger abstention “exemplifies one
class of cases in which federal-court abstention is required: When there is a
parallel, pending state criminal proceeding, federal courts must refrain from
enjoining the state prosecution.”248 “[P]articular state civil proceedings that
are akin to criminal prosecutions” also implicate Younger, as do
proceedings involving “a State’s interest in enforcing the orders and
judgments of its courts.”249
Some jurists find an apt comparison between the tribal remedies doctrine
and administrative exhaustion.250 This tends to be a position held by those
claiming the doctrine does not apply to state courts. Courts that conclude
the tribal remedies doctrine is mandatory for state courts often distinguish it
from administrative exhaustion,251 and some point out similarities with

245. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S. 81, 89 (2006) (internal quotations marks and alterations
omitted).
246. Id. (internal quotations marks and alterations omitted).
247. Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 (1996) (citations omitted). It
usually applies when there is: “[1)] a pending state proceeding; 2) a federal case involving
the same or functionally similar claims and parties; 3) no constitutional or federalism
problems are presented; and, 4) abstention is ordered out of considerations of wise judicial
administration.” Comm. on Fed. Courts of the N.Y. State Bar Ass’n, The Abstention
Doctrine: The Consequences of Federal Court Deference to State Court Proceedings, 122
F.R.D. 89, 98 (1988).
248. Sprint Commc’ns, Inc. v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 72 (2013).
249. Id. at 72–73.
250. See Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 120,
416 P.3d 401 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Astorga v. Wing, 118
P.3d 1103, 1106–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
251. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 104 (Himonas, J., concurring); Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d
50, 60 (Conn. 1998).
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abstention rules.252 State court applicability aside, other jurists distinguish
abstention from the doctrine.253
Rather than fitting the tribal remedies doctrine into pre-existing
categories like administrative exhaustion and abstention, it is best to view
the doctrine as something independent, though it exhibits certain
characteristics of established legal rules. Based on review of the discussions
in cases on this subject, there are least three common issues built into these
legal doctrines: (1) whether it is jurisdictional or prudential; (2) whether it
can be waived; and (3) whether it involves balancing different factors. 254
A. Jurisdictional or Prudential
The tribal remedies doctrine, Colorado River abstention, and Younger
abstention are prudential rules rooted in comity, not the court’s
jurisdiction.255 Administrative exhaustion, however, is sometimes
prudential and at other times jurisdictional. For example, the statutorily
mandated exhaustion of administrative remedies in the Freedom of
Information Act is prudential; 256 whereas the Federal Tort Claims Act’s
requirement of exhaustion with the applicable agency is tied to the court’s

252. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 677 n.8; Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 135 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Dicta in Iowa Mutual makes the comparison to abstention.
Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 n.8 (1987). Scholars picked up on this.
Kirsten Matoy Carlson, Note, Towards Tribal Sovereignty and Judicial Efficiency: Ordering
the Defenses of Tribal Sovereign Immunity and Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies, 101 MICH.
L. REV. 569, 576 n.44 (2002); Watson, supra note 31, at 534–35; Timothy W. Joranko,
Exhaustion of Tribal Remedies in the Lower Courts After National Farmers Union and Iowa
Mutual: Toward a Consistent Treatment of Tribal Courts by the Federal Judicial System, 78
MINN. L. REV. 259, 277 (1993).
253. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 106 (Himonas, J., concurring).
254. In the context of an article encouraging federal courts to reassess their
implementation of the tribal remedies doctrine, Professor Watson provides a thorough
discussion of the doctrine alongside administrative exhaustion and abstention. Watson, supra
note 31, at 588–609.
255. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 15, 20 n.14 (tribal remedies doctrine); Sprint Commc’ns, Inc.
v. Jacobs, 571 U.S. 69, 77 (2013) (Younger); Allian v. Allian, No. 18 C 3825, 2018 WL
6591422, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 14, 2018) (Colorado River).
256. Jean-Pierre v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 880 F. Supp. 2d 95, 104 n.8 (D.D.C. 2012);
Hull v. IRS, 656 F.3d 1174, 1181–82 (10th Cir. 2011) (collecting cases). The Supreme Court
recently held that a specific aspect of the administrative exhaustion framework within Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is prudential and not jurisdictional. Fort Bend Cty. v.
Davis, 139 S. Ct. 1843, 1846–47 (2019) (“We hold that Title VII’s charge-filing instruction
is not jurisdictional, a term generally reserved to describe the classes of cases a court may
entertain (subject-matter jurisdiction) . . . .”).
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jurisdiction.257 With the former, failure to exhaust does not force the court
to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction—but with the latter, it does.
Courts generally employ abstention in “exceptional” circumstances 258
and describe it as “the exception, not the rule.”259 This is because the
baseline against abstention is “the virtually unflagging obligation of the
federal courts to exercise the jurisdiction given them.”260 Tribal exhaustion,
however, is the default when the tribal court has a legitimate claim to
jurisdiction, and the nontribal court retains jurisdiction only if the case
meets an exception established by the Supreme Court. 261
The comity concerns of Colorado River and Younger relate to state
courts. But the tribal remedies doctrine emphasizes comity toward tribal
courts. Between federal and state courts on one hand, and between nontribal
and tribal courts on the other, comity has significantly different meanings.
In the context of a tribe’s unique sovereign status in the country’s history,
comity is directed at supporting tribal self-government. 262 Younger’s respect
for state courts comes from an entirely distinct rationale—the “recognition
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state
governments, and a continuance of the belief that the National Government
will fare best if the States and their institutions are left free to perform their
separate functions in their separate ways.”263 The driver for comity in
Colorado River is “considerations of wise judicial administration, giving
regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive disposition
of litigation.”264 These are different flavors of cross-jurisdictional respect.
Further, Colorado River and Younger come into play in cases where the
court already has jurisdiction. 265 Courts are divided about whether the same
257. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 834 (5th Cir. 2019).
258. Jacobs, 571 U.S. at 73 (“Circumstances fitting within the Younger doctrine, we have
stressed, are ‘exceptional’ . . . .”).
259. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 813 (1976)
(“Abstention from the exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule.”).
260. Id. at 817.
261. Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 n.21
(1985); see Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 369 (2001).
262. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 14 (1987); see also El Paso Nat. Gas
Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S. 473, 484 (1999) (“Exhaustion was appropriate in [National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual] because ‘Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal
self-government.’”) (quoting National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856).
263. Middlesex Cty. Ethics Comm. v. Garden State Bar Ass’n, 457 U.S. 423, 431 (1982)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
264. Colorado River, 424 U.S. at 817 (internal alteration and quotation marks omitted).
265. Brooks v. N.H. Supreme Court, 80 F.3d 633, 638 (1st Cir. 1996) (describing
Younger as “paradigm” where “a federal court must abstain from reaching the merits of a

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol44/iss2/3

No. 2] TRIBAL REMEDIES, EXHAUSTION, AND STATE COURTS

275

is true for the tribal remedies doctrine; some find jurisdiction must come
first,266 and others conclude that the doctrine may precede a jurisdictional
inquiry. 267
B. Waiver
The function of waiver is another difference between the legal rules. A
party generally may not waive its ability to invoke the tribal remedies
doctrine, 268 and a court can invoke the doctrine sua sponte. 269 For
administrative exhaustion grounded in jurisdiction, waiver is not available,
as a party may raise the issue at any point in a motion to dismiss for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction. 270 But prudential administrative exhaustion is a
defense that may be waived, and courts usually address the issue in the

case over which it has jurisdiction”); Thomas-Wise v. Nat’l City Mortg. Co., No. 14 C 3460,
2015 WL 641770, at *2 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 13, 2015) (“Colorado River abstention comes into
play only after a federal court has otherwise assured itself of its subject matter
jurisdiction.”).
266. Ninigret Dev. Corp. v. Narragansett Indian Wetuomuck Hous. Auth., 207 F.3d 21,
28–29 (1st Cir. 2000) (“[A]s long as federal subject-matter jurisdiction exists, a defense
predicated on tribal sovereign immunity is susceptible to direct adjudication in the federal
courts, without reference to the tribal exhaustion doctrine.”) (citing cases from the Fifth and
Seventh Circuits).
267. Garcia v. Akwesasne Hous. Auth., 268 F.3d 76, 79 (2d Cir. 2001) (“We consider
tribal exhaustion first; sovereign immunity second.”); Davis v. Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa Indians, 193 F.3d 990, 992 (8th Cir. 1999); Romero v. Wounded Knee, LLC, No.
CIV. 16-5024-JLV, 2018 WL 4279446, at *2 (D.S.D. Aug. 31, 2018) (“Tribal sovereign
immunity goes to the court’s subject matter jurisdiction and usually the court must address
jurisdictional issues first. But the precedent of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Eighth Circuit requires the court to enforce the exhaustion of tribal court remedies before
fully analyzing tribal sovereign immunity.”). The Romero court found that, even in the face
of Title VII claims subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction, the tribal court should still have
the opportunity to assess a tribal sovereign immunity defense; if the defendant was immune,
then it would not matter whether the tribal court could exercise authority over the Title VII
claims. Romero, 2018 WL 4279446, at *2–4.
268. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 445 (10th Cir. 1991). But see World Fuel Servs.,
Inc. v. Nambe Pueblo Dev. Corp., 362 F. Supp. 3d 1021, 1090 n.28 (D.N.M. Jan. 23, 2019)
(discussing that waiver may be possible); see also Ninigret, 207 F.3d at 31 n.7 (“There is
virtually no case law as to the effectiveness vel non of an express disclaimer of tribal court
remedies.”).
269. United States v. Tsosie, 92 F.3d 1037, 1041 (10th Cir. 1996); Romero, 2018 WL
4279446, at *2.
270. Coleman v. United States, 912 F.3d 824, 835 (5th Cir. 2019) (affirming district
court’s “holding [that] exhaustion [is] a jurisdictional prerequisite for FTCA claims that
cannot be waived.”) (citing McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 109–13 (1993)).
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context of a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim. 271 Both forms of
abstention are waivable and may be raised sua sponte.272
C. Balancing
Turning to whether or not a court balances factors in applying each legal
rule, the tribal remedies doctrine does not involve a balancing inquiry—
generally, if the tribal court has a colorable claim to jurisdiction, tribal court
proceedings must occur.273 Similarly, administrative exhaustion
incorporates no balancing judgments; administrative remedies were
exhausted or they were not, and before moving forward the court either
requires exhaustion (if jurisdictional) or considers whether the issue is
properly before the court (if prudential). Abstention under Colorado River
asks the court to weigh various factors in examining the need to stay its
hand or dismiss the case. 274 However, some courts find that “balancing the
Younger elements, rather than determining whether each element, on its
own, is satisfied, conflicts with the requirement that federal courts abstain
only in those cases falling within the ‘carefully defined’ boundaries of
federal abstention doctrines.”275 Whether an exception to the tribal remedies
doctrine is met draws upon the court’s legal judgment in a more
discretionary manner, but there still is not a multi-factorial balancing
inquiry similar to abstention rules. 276
D. Hierarchy
There is another distinction between the tribal remedies doctrine and
administrative exhaustion worth noting. Some who find that the tribal
271. See Acosta v. FBI, 946 F. Supp. 2d 47, 49–52 (D.D.C. Apr. 17, 2013) (analyzing
FOIA exhaustion under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) and noting an agency’s “lapse waives any
requirement Plaintiff had to exhaust his administrative appeals”).
272. Lamex Foods, Inc. v. Audeliz Lebrón Corp., 646 F.3d 100, 112 n.15 (1st Cir. 2011)
(holding Colorado River may be waived and also the court can raise it sua sponte); Bice v.
La. Pub. Def. Bd., 677 F.3d 712, 716 n.3 (5th Cir. 2012) (finding Younger may be waived);
Hill v. Snyder, 878 F.3d 193, 206 (6th Cir. 2017) (noting court can raise Younger sua
sponte).
273. See Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 107,
416 P.3d 401 (Himonas, J., concurring).
274. Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000)
(balancing the Colorado River factors); see also Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 106 (Himonas, J.,
concurring) (describing Colorado River as “balanc[ing] multiple factors, including judicial
economy concerns and the avoidance of piecemeal litigation”).
275. AmerisourceBergen Corp. v. Roden, 495 F.3d 1143, 1148 (9th Cir. 2007) (quoting
New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359 (1989)).
276. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 107 (Himonas, J., concurring).
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remedies doctrine should not apply in state courts make a certain point
about the hierarchical structure of an exhaustion requirement. The latest
iteration of this argument is in Associate Chief Justice Lee’s opinion in
Harvey.277 According to this view, exhaustion “is a principle that regulates
the timing of proceedings in tribunals that operate in a hierarchical
relationship.”278 Because federal courts and not state courts have the power
to review tribal court rulings after the tribal remedies doctrine is enforced,
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual are “not implicated” in state court.279
This is due to the lack of a “hierarchical relationship between the two
sovereign courts—and thus no right of direct review.”280
This line of reasoning glosses over important differences between
administrative agencies and tribal nations. As Justice Himonas explained in
Harvey, the argument fails to appreciate that, “[u]nlike administrative
agencies, or even states, tribes are not subordinates in our constitutional
hierarchy.”281 Tribes “remain separate sovereigns pre-existing the
Constitution,” subject to Congress’ “plenary control.”282 The timing of the
existence of tribal nations illustrates a distinction between their authority
and that of administrative agencies. 283 A federal agency where claims must
be exhausted came into existence after the creation of the federal
government. And some agencies, like the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (EEOC), were created long after the establishment of the
federal government.284 If the federal government went away, so would the
federal agencies. Native nations on the other hand, were active long before
the United States.285 Their existence, while under the control of Congress

277. Id. ¶ 121 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Astorga v.
Wing, 118 P.3d 1103, 1106–08 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2005).
278. Id. (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citation and quotation
marks omitted).
279. Id. ¶ 123.
280. Id. (citing Astorga, 118 P.3d at 1107).
281. Id. ¶ 104 (Himonas, J., concurring).
282. Id. (Himonas, J., concurring) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Michigan
v. Bay Mills Indian Cmty., 572 U.S. 782, 788–89 (2014)).
283. This distinction in ontology is key to keeping the two separate. See generally
Thomas Hofweber, Logic and Ontology: 3.1. Different Conceptions of Ontology, STAN.
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Oct. 11, 2017), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/logic-ontology/
#Ont (exploring different ideas of ontology).
284. Congress created the EEOC as part of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 42
U.S.C. § 2000e-4 (2018).
285. Cooter & Fikentscher, supra note 2, at 298–302.
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within the framework of federal Indian law, is independent from the federal
and state governments of the United States.
Furthermore, the exertion of authority over people is different between
agencies and tribes. Agencies have power over people as arms of the
federal government, which exerts sovereign power over American citizens
that they granted to the government. 286 This applies equally to non-Indian
and Indian people. 287 The power of tribal judiciaries, functioning as
branches of tribal governments, is not drawn from all Americans 288 and
affects non-Indian and Indian people differently. The jurisdictional reach of
tribal courts is much more limited than federal agencies. Tribal courts have
jurisdiction over non-Indian people in specifically designated instances
only. 289 And their criminal jurisdiction is even more circumscribed. 290 At
the same time, “tribes have historically been regarded as unconstrained by
those constitutional provisions framed specifically as limitations on federal
or state authority.”291
The bottom line is that federal administrative agencies and tribal
governments are not amenable to analogy. Consequently, it is a weakness
for an argument—based on that analogy—to claim that the tribal remedies
doctrine does not apply to state courts. The comparison might be helpful for
giving general context to the tribal remedies doctrine, but not for resolving
complicated and substantive questions about it.
This section spotlights the problems with attempts to cabin the tribal
remedies doctrine within the exhaustion of administrative remedies or
forms of abstention. While the tribal remedies doctrine, crafted by the
Supreme Court, shares certain characteristics with other court-created and
statutory legal rules, no twin doctrine has been identified yet—and likely
286. THE FEDERALIST NO. 22, at 146 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(acknowledging the People as “that pure original fountain of all legitimate authority”); THE
FEDERALIST NO. 49, at 339 (James Madison) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961) (“[T]he people are
the only legitimate fountain of power . . . .”).
287. In 1924, Congress established that all Indian people are American citizens. 8 U.S.C.
§ 1401 (2018).
288. United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (describing tribes as “‘a
separate people’ possessing ‘the power of regulating their internal and social relations’”)
(quoting United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 381–82 (1886)).
289. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 557 (1981).
290. Ennis & Mayhew, supra note 17, at 429–32; see Greg S. Keogh, Note, Extending
Tribal Criminal Jurisdiction Outside of Indian Country: Kelsey v. Pope, 43 AM. INDIAN L.
REV. 223, 224–27 (2018–2019); Fortson, supra note 15, at 105–14.
291. United States v. Bryant, 136 S. Ct. 1954, 1962 (2016) (quoting Santa Clara Pueblo
v. Martinez, 436 U.S. 49, 56 (1978)).
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none exists. Considering how Native nations maintain a unique role in
balance with the federal government and individual states, this conclusion
is natural. As a result, determining whether the tribal remedies doctrine
applies to state courts requires an analytical foundation separate from
administrative exhaustion and abstention. The Court’s decision in Iowa
Mutual accomplishes that.
V. State Court Applicability
The language of Iowa Mutual and the need to support tribal sovereignty
compel state courts to apply the tribal remedies doctrine. It is true that the
U.S. Supreme Court, the creator of the doctrine, has not addressed state
court applicability. But in the context of applying federal Indian law, with
its principles and history, the next analytical step after noting that the issue
is unresolved is not to fashion a new interpretation of the balance of power
between tribal, state, and federal governments. Instead, when the starting
point in Indian law is silence, the Supreme Court provided guidance in
Iowa Mutual: “Because the Tribe retains all inherent attributes of
sovereignty that have not been divested by the Federal Government, the
proper inference from silence . . . is that the sovereign power . . . remains
intact.”292 With this foundation, it is difficult to envision a path forward for
finding a state court need not yield to a tribal court’s determination of its
own jurisdiction. 293
Based on a straightforward interpretation of Iowa Mutual, the tribal
remedies doctrine applies to state courts. The Court began its tribal
exhaustion analysis by firmly rooting the doctrine in the federal policy of
supporting tribal self-government.294 To explain the reach of that policy, the
292. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 18 (1987) (quoting Merrion v. Jicarilla
Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 149 n.14 (1982)) (citing Martinez, 436 U.S. at 60 (“[A] proper
respect both for tribal sovereignty itself and for the plenary authority of Congress in this area
cautions that we tread lightly in the absence of clear indications of legislative intent.”)) (“In
the absence of any indication that Congress intended the diversity statute to limit the
jurisdiction of the tribal courts, we decline petitioner’s invitation to hold that tribal
sovereignty can be impaired in this fashion.”).
293. Justice Himonas makes a similar point in Harvey. In view of Congress’ express
“preference for limiting state control over Indian affairs in statutes including the Indian
Child Welfare Act . . . and the Major Crimes Act,” Justice Himonas stated “it would be
anomalous to conclude that the tribal exhaustion rule only applies in federal court.” Harvey
v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 96–97, 416 P.3d 401
(Himonas, J., concurring).
294. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14; see also El Paso Nat. Gas Co. v. Neztsosie, 526 U.S.
473, 484 (1999) (“Exhaustion was appropriate in [National Farmers and Iowa Mutual]
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Court specifically pointed out that in some situations it overrides state
authority. 295 For instance, whether or not a particular federal law preempts
state authority, the need to promote a tribe’s self-government may be a
controlling consideration.296 In this sense, the federal policy has application
even where Congress has not spoken.
This language provides context to Iowa Mutual’s explanation of why the
doctrine applies to federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The Court
emphasized the danger that “unconditional access” to a federal forum
would pose to tribal courts.297 Allowing litigants to avoid a tribal court
system would create “direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby
impairing the [tribal courts’] authority over reservation affairs.”298 While
the issue before the Court in Iowa Mutual focused on whether a federal
forum would compete with a tribal one, the danger highlighted in Iowa
Mutual seamlessly applies when considering a state forum and a tribal
court.299 Iowa Mutual confirms this itself. In cautioning against
“unconditional access,” the Court held that “[a]djudication of such matters
by any nontribal court also infringes upon tribal law—making authority,
because tribal courts are best qualified to interpret and apply tribal law.”300

because ‘Congress is committed to a policy of supporting tribal self-government . . . .’”)
(quoting Nat’l Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)).
295. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 14.
296. Id.
297. Id. at 16.
298. Id.
299. See Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 98,
416 P.3d 401 (Himonas, J., concurring) (“[T]he tribal exhaustion rule admits of no
distinction between federal and state courts.”); Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 63 (Conn.
1998) (“In our view, direct competition from state courts is equally likely to disrupt that
federal policy. Because we owe no less deference to federal, statutory based policy than do
the federal courts, we should be no more willing than they to risk disruption of this federal
policy by exercising jurisdiction over cases to which the doctrine would apply.”); Meyer &
Assocs., Inc. v. Coushatta Tribe of La., 2007-2256, p. 12 (La. 9/23/08); 992 So.2d 446, 460
(Kimball, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Supreme Court has held that unconditional access to the
federal forum places it in direct competition with the tribal courts, thereby impairing the
latter’s authority over reservation affairs. Certainly the same can be said of unconditional
access to the state forum.”); Klammer v. Lower Sioux Convenience Store, 535 N.W.2d 379,
381 (Minn. Ct. App. 1995) (“We must acknowledge that unconditional access to state court
would similarly impair the tribal court’s authority.”).
300. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16.
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Opponents of applying the tribal remedies doctrine to state courts
dismiss Iowa Mutual’s use of the phrase, “any nontribal court,” as dicta.301
But the phrase does not need to be a standalone holding to impact the
application of tribal exhaustion. If it is not a holding, then it is at least an
explanation of one—namely, that a permissive approach to competition
with tribal courts breaches the federal policy to support tribal selfgovernment. Accordingly, adjudication of matters subject to tribal court
jurisdiction in “any nontribal court” contravenes longstanding federal
policy and Iowa Mutual’s central holding.302 The Solicitor General’s
amicus brief in Harvey stated a position consistent with this, that the
doctrine “applies as a matter of ‘federal policy’ when necessary to prevent
‘direct competition with the tribal courts’ by ‘any nontribal court’—which
would appear to include a state court—on matters of tribal ‘authority over
reservation affairs.’”303 Justice O’Connor’s concurrence in Hicks provides
additional support, expressly framing the doctrine as “determining the
relationship between tribal courts and state and federal courts.”304
Focusing on Justice Stevens’s dissent from Iowa Mutual’s exhaustion
analysis further supports applying the tribal remedies doctrine to state
courts. Justice Stevens argued for a narrow construction of whether
litigation outside the tribal courts undermines tribal self-government. 305 In
Justice Stevens’ view, because “the pendency of an action in the state court
is no bar to proceedings concerning the same matter in the Federal court
having jurisdiction[,]” National Farmers applies only when there is a
pending tribal suit raising a “question concerning the jurisdiction of the
[tribal court.]”306 Justice Stevens thought that interpretation struck the right
balance between the sovereignty of tribes and states.307 But the opinion of
the Court embraced a starkly different reading of National Farmers and a
more expansive view of the tribal remedies doctrine. It is logical to infer
that the Court refused to restrict the doctrine because National Farmers did
not set forth such a limited rule and the federal policy promoting self301. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 120–121 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
302. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16.
303. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at
*12 (quoting Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16).
304. Nevada v. Hicks, 533 U.S. 353, 398 (2001) (O’Connor, J., concurring in part and
concurring in the judgment).
305. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 21 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
306. Id. at 20–22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
307. Id. at 22 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
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government does not accord with Justice Stevens’s view. Rather, whether
or not jurisdiction is based on § 1331 or § 1332, and whether or not the
tribal suit directly challenges the tribe’s jurisdiction, the holdings of
National Farmers and Iowa Mutual show that a hands-off approach to
litigants avoiding tribal jurisdiction contradicts tribal sovereignty and
federal policy. It follows that litigants may not have unconditional access to
state courts when the tribe has jurisdiction, and the tribal remedies doctrine
applies to state courts.
A uniform approach to applying the tribal remedies doctrine across the
states is vital to tribal sovereignty. Beyond the eighteen states that
addressed the doctrine, many states with tribes have yet to resolve the
question of whether National Farmers and Iowa Mutual contain holdings
they must follow.308 Even before more states make their determinations, the
current array of outcomes throughout the country creates a problematic
situation where the sovereignty of Native nations means something
different depending on location. In addition to being fundamentally unfair
to Native people, allowing the arbitrariness of geography to dictate
sovereignty is contrary to the federal government’s trust responsibility and
policy of supporting tribal self-government.
VI. Requiring a Pending Tribal Case
In contrast to the question of state court application, it is less clear
whether state courts should be required to yield to tribal jurisdiction in the
absence of a pending tribal case. The two leading state decisions applying
the doctrine resolve this question differently. In Harvey, the Utah Supreme
Court refused to impose this requirement, 309 but in Drumm, the Connecticut
Supreme Court ruled that a pending action in tribal court is a prerequisite. 310
Federal courts generally do not mandate a pending tribal action before
invoking the tribal remedies doctrine. 311 At least three of the states that have
not adopted the tribal remedies doctrine focused on this issue and expressed

308. See Appendices I and II.
309. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 42–43,
416 P.3d 401.
310. Drumm v. Brown, 716 A.2d 50, 64–66 (Conn. 1998).
311. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. UTE Indian Tribe of the
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at
*18–19 (collecting cases from the First, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits); see also Heldt v. Payday
Fin., LLC, 12 F. Supp. 3d 1170, 1180 (D.S.D. 2014).
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the view that a tribal court case is an essential ingredient. 312 Based on the
interpretation of Iowa Mutual above, and an appreciation of the doctrine as
distinct from administrative exhaustion and abstention, a pending tribal case
is not necessary for applying the doctrine.
Harvey did not provide a thorough analysis of this question—it cited
federal cases echoing its determination that the “doctrine does not require a
case to be pending in the tribal court.”313 Federal courts largely take the
view that the comity concerns expressed in National Farmers and Iowa
Mutual do not depend on a concurrent tribal case. 314
The Connecticut Supreme Court came to its conclusion in Drumm after a
close reading of National Farmers, Iowa Mutual, and Strate. The Drumm
court concluded each case “use[d] narrow language . . . indicating the
presupposition of pending proceedings.”315 Drumm then grounded its
holding in “three complementary policy considerations.”316 The court found
that “the impact on a tribal court’s authority of a nontribal court’s
adjudication of a matter over which the tribal court could, but has not,
exercised jurisdiction is much more attenuated. Any such effect is
speculative and indirect, consisting merely of a lost opportunity or a
potential unrealized.”317 Second, relying on Connecticut law, Drumm
pointed out that a court with jurisdiction has a “duty to adjudicate the case
before it[,]” except “in an extreme, compelling situation.”318 And third,
citing state law, Drumm gave weight to the “consideration of the traditional
right of a plaintiff to select his forum.”319
Drumm is correct that the Supreme Court’s language in National
Farmers and Iowa Mutual framed this issue narrowly, suggesting that the
Court presupposed a pending tribal case when applying the tribal remedies
312. Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson, 405 P.3d 13, 18–19 (Idaho 2017); Harrison v.
Boyd Mississippi, Inc., 700 So.2d 247, 251 n.3 (Miss. 1997); Seneca v. Seneca, 741
N.Y.S.2d 375, 379 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002).
313. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 42.
314. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991) (“The fact that Smith
apparently has not yet presented his case to a tribal court does not diminish the comity
considerations present in this case. Lower courts have held comity to be a concern even
when a case filed in federal court has not yet been filed in tribal court.”) (citing cases from
the Eighth, Ninth, and Tenth Circuits).
315. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 65.
316. Id.
317. Id.
318. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Ahneman v. Ahneman, 706 A.2d
960 (Conn. 1998)).
319. Id. at 66 (citing Picketts v. Int’l Playtex, Inc., 576 A.2d 518 (Conn. 1990)).
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doctrine. 320 The Harvey dissent made a parallel point, claiming the Supreme
Court’s cases turned on “the need to allow the ‘forum whose jurisdiction is
being challenged’” to address its own jurisdiction. 321 However, the Court
used broad language in emphasizing the need to protect tribal sovereignty
from external jurisdiction, which is the core of the doctrine. 322 Iowa Mutual
was clear that “unconditional access” to outside dispute resolution posed a
direct threat to tribal authority. 323 Access exists whether or not a tribal case
is pending.
Consequently, Drumm is not entirely correct that the “impact on a tribal
court’s authority . . . is much more attenuated”324 because Iowa Mutual
broadly articulated its determination that “unconditional access” to
nontribal courts will undermine tribes. 325 Similarly, the Harvey dissent
takes a view toward the doctrine that is too restricting. 326 Iowa Mutual’s
majority foreclosed such a position in its rejection of Justice Stevens’
confining interpretation of whether nontribal litigation undercuts tribal selfgovernment. When, on one hand, there is narrow language the Supreme
Court used in prior cases, and, on the other hand, the comity concerns at the
heart of the doctrine are still applicable, resolving the tension in favor of
comity accords with the doctrine’s spirit. As federal courts have found,
“[t]he fact that [a party] has not yet presented his case to a tribal court does
not diminish the comity considerations present” in federal court.327
The second policy rationale identified in Drumm is not on point when it
comes to the tribal remedies doctrine.328 When a court analyzes the

320. Id. at 65.
321. Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 138, 416
P.3d 401 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (quoting Nat’l Farmers
Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 856 (1985)).
322. Iowa Mut. Ins. Co. v. LaPlante, 480 U.S. 9, 16 (1987); Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 98
(Himonas, J., concurring).
323. 480 U.S. at 16.
324. Drumm, 716 A.2d at 65.
325. Iowa Mut., 480 U.S. at 16.
326. Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶¶ 138–140 (Lee, A.C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (citing National Farmers, 471 U.S. at 856).
327. Smith v. Moffett, 947 F.2d 442, 444 (10th Cir. 1991).
328. Justice Himonas’s concurrence in Harvey provides a thoughtful response to the third
policy rationale identified in Drumm—deferring to the plaintiff’s choice of forum.
Answering the Harvey dissent’s claim that tribal exhaustion “overrid[es]” the right to “selfgovernance” by disregarding an Indian litigant’s forum choice, Justice Himonas explained,
“The ‘self-governance’ that the tribal exhaustion doctrine seeks to promote is the selfgovernance that comes from encouraging the development of tribal judicial institutions; it is
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doctrine, the starting point is assessing whether there is tribal jurisdiction
over the case; it is not the nontribal court’s “unflagging obligation” to
resolve the case, which is how abstention rules function. 329 Similarly, the
tribal remedies doctrine does not control when the case fits within an
exception the Supreme Court created, but in the abstention context, the
nontribal court’s decision to abstain is the exception. As discussed earlier,
the history and unique role of tribes in relation to state and federal
governments set the tribal remedies doctrine apart from other traditional
rules of court jurisdiction.330 With a majority of the policy reasons
presented in Drumm and echoed in the Harvey dissent falling short of
showing the necessity of a pending case in tribal court, and because
imposing such a rule contravenes Iowa Mutual, the absence of a tribal case
is not an obstacle to applying the doctrine.
Arguing in favor of requiring a pending tribal case, the Solicitor
General’s amicus brief in Harvey asserted that, absent a tribal suit, there is
no conflict with tribal courts because Williams v. Lee curbs any problematic
competition.331 The government accurately points out that state courts are
capable of hearing a variety of tribe-related disputes: issues of reservation
access that arise out of Indian Country; claims a tribal member brings
against a non-Indian person, even those arising in Indian Country; and cases
touching on a tribe’s interests and involving interpretations of tribal law. 332
While the tribal remedies doctrine prioritizes the protection of tribal
authority, it is important not to lose sight of the tribe-related matters that
state courts can handle and the safeguard established in Williams v. Lee.
The government’s line of reasoning offers a solid argument for allowing
states to demand a tribal case before applying the doctrine. However, if a
state court adopts that view, it should also consider another aspect of the
government’s argument. As somewhat of a hybrid position, the Solicitor
General proposed allowing the state court to hold on to claims properly
before it and peel off specific claims or questions for the tribal court to
address—”in a manner analogous to the principles of primary jurisdiction

not the policy of allowing litigants to choose their own forum.” Harvey, 2017 UT 75, ¶ 108
n.3 (Himonas, J., concurring).
329. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
330. See supra Part IV.
331. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae, Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of the
Uintah & Ouray Reservation, 139 S. Ct. 784 (2019) (No. 17-1301), 2018 WL 6382963, at
*12–13 (citation omitted).
332. Id. at *13.
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or certification of state-law issues to a state court.”333 This view respects
both the essence of the tribal remedies doctrine and the legitimate role state
courts have in certain cases encompassing tribal law questions and claims
arising on reservations.334
VII. Conclusion
Whether it is federal, state, or tribal, a court or dispute resolution system
is indispensable to a sovereign’s rule of law and cultural preservation.
Because the current legal landscape in the United States permits individual
state courts to decide whether to apply the tribal remedies doctrine, the
authority of tribal courts varies throughout the country. Considering the
importance of courts in Native nations, that result is not acceptable.
Supreme Court precedent, specifically Iowa Mutual, requires state courts to
apply the tribal remedies doctrine. Separating the doctrine from the legal
rules of administrative exhaustion and abstention confirms this conclusion
and reveals that a pending tribal court action is not required before applying
the tribal remedies doctrine in state courts.

333. Id. at *21.
334. A follow-up issue is whether the tribal remedies doctrine itself mandates this
piecemeal approach, or whether states are free to implement it if they choose. Because the
Supreme Court’s cases on the doctrine do not get close to this narrow issue, it may be best
left to the states.
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Appendix I
State Courts That Have Addressed the Tribal Remedies Doctrine335

335. The states shown in gray have not addressed the tribal remedies doctrine.
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Appendix II
Distinguishing between states and territories with: (1) federally
recognized tribes only; (2) state-recognized tribes only; (3) both federally
and state-recognized tribes; and (4) neither. 336

Yellow—Federal only00Red—State only
Orange—Federal and state00Grey—Neither

336. List of Federally Recognized Tribes by State, MASS. CTR. FOR NATIVE AM.
AWARENESS, http://www.mcnaa.org/uploads/1/2/6/5/12656184/federally_recognized_tribes_
by_state.pdf (last visited Aug. 2, 2019).
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